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BLURRED LINES: DISPARATE IMPACT AND
DISPARATE TREATMENT CHALLENGES TO
SUBJECTIVE DECISIONS—THE CASE OF
REDUCTIONS IN FORCE
ALLAN KING*
ALEXANDRA HEMENWAY**
ABSTRACT
Subjective employment decisions may be challenged under
disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and/or disparate
impact (the discriminatory consequences of a neutral policy) theories of discrimination. However, these theories and supporting
evidence often are conflated when the criteria for selecting employees
are ill-defined or unrecorded. In those instances, the process by
which employees are selected merges with the selections themselves,
these legal theories converge as well. This Article critically discusses
how courts have struggled to distinguish these theories in cases
alleging a discriminatory reduction in force. It suggests how these
cases should be submitted to juries, to preserve the liability and
remedies specific to each theory.
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INTRODUCTION
In Ricci v. DeStefano,1 the Supreme Court considered the
conflict that arises when an employer, fearing disparate impact
liability as a result of its screening examination process, acts on
race-conscious grounds to deprive white employees of promotions
they otherwise would receive.2 The Court resolved that conflict
by holding that the employer’s actions would be justified only if
there was a “strong basis in evidence” that, by failing to act, the
employer would be exposed to disparate impact liability.3 This
Article considers another juncture at which these theories of discrimination collide, and illustrates the resulting conflict in the
case of a reduction in force, or, RIF.
The conflict arises in the following circumstance. Suppose
an employer instructs its managers to rely on their subjective
assessment of an employee’s past performance and career potential, and identify those to be riffed.4 The employer then adopts
the managers’ RIF recommendations. A riffed employee alleges the
employer’s decision was intentionally discriminatory, subjecting
the employee to unlawful disparate treatment; the employee also
alleges the employer’s decision effected a disparate impact, under both Title VII5 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).6 The question addressed here is whether those allegations are mutually exclusive. This Article discusses how courts
have dealt with similar cases at the intersections of these theories and recommends how these issues should be submitted to
the finder of fact.7
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id. at 562–63.
3 Id. at 563.
4 “Riffed” refers to the action of ending an employee’s employment through
a reduction in force action. Summary of Reduction in Force Under OPM’s
Regulation, OFF. PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/work
force-restructuring/reductions-in-force/#url=Summary [https://perma.cc/7D2F
-LZ6E] (“In the Federal Government, layoffs are called reduction in force (RIF)
actions. When an agency must abolish positions, the RIF regulations determine whether an employee keeps his or her present position, or whether the
employee has a right to a different position.”).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
6 29 U.S.C. § 621.
7 See infra Part V.
1
2
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Further underscoring the tension between these two claims
is, in the RIF hypothetical above (and as is common), managers
record only their ultimate RIF/no RIF decisions; there is no tangible evidence from which a fact-finder can review the weight a
manager gave to an employee’s performance because there is no
ascertainable “rating” assigned to individual employee performance
motivating the RIF selection.8 Under these circumstances, courts
are likely to deem the impact of each selection criterion “not capable of separation for analysis” for purposes of proving a disparate impact claim.9 As a result, the sole indication of how an
employee fared under this hypothetical selection system is whether
the employee was riffed.10
Whether the employer’s decision resulted from its ostensibly neutral criteria (the contention in a disparate impact case)11 or
the biased decisions of the managers who apply those criteria
(the contention in a disparate treatment case)12 thus is unknowable from data regarding the ultimate RIF selections.13 Under
each theory—disparate impact and disparate treatment—the data
analysis will be the same: a comparison of the demographics of
the workforce before and after the RIF.14 In such cases, the same
bottom-line statistical result may be used to bolster either theory
of discrimination, blurring the legal distinction between them.15
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982); N.Y.C. Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585–86 (1979).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (“[I]f the complaining party can
demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking
process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process
may be analyzed as one employment practice.”); see, e.g., Grant v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville, 446 F. App’x 737, 740 (6th Cir. 2011).
10 See § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i); see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 442; Beazer, 440 U.S.
at 585–86; supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
11 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
12 Id. at 986.
13 Id. at 1002.
14 See Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 1982) (relying
upon the same statistical evidence to analyze a disparate treatment and disparate impact claim).
15 See Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title
VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31
UCLA L. REV. 305, 321–22 (1983).
8
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I.THE ELEMENTS OF A DISPARATE IMPACT CASE
The Supreme Court first recognized Title VII’s prohibition
of disparate impact discrimination in 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power
Company.16 Griggs concerned the lawfulness of an employer’s
requirement of a high school education and the passing of an intelligence test as a condition of employment or transfer between
departments.17 Finding these requirements disproportionately
excluded black applicants from the positions they sought, the
Court found these practices violated Title VII, absent proof these
criteria were related to job performance.18 Whether these practices were intended to be exclusionary was irrelevant.19
The Griggs court had no reason to define a “practice” that
could result in disparate impact discrimination because the degree
and testing requirements were clearly evident and undisputed.20
Nearly two decades later the Court addressed the importance of
identifying a facially neutral practice in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust.21 In prior cases, the Court had no trouble concluding that
height and weight requirements,22 methadone use,23 and residency requirements24 could provide the foundation for disparate
impact claims. Watson required the Court to consider whether, in
addition to these objective requirements, a subjective criterion
also could be the focus of a disparate impact claim.25
Seven Justices answered affirmatively, although the portion of Justice O’Connor’s opinion that describes the contours of that
claim garnered only a four-justice plurality.26 Nevertheless, Watson
has been highly influential in shaping subsequent litigation, and
many of the plurality’s views were ratified the following term by a
Court majority in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.27 A portion
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
Id. at 427–28.
18 Id. at 432.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 427.
21 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988) (plurality opinion).
22 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
23 See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590–91 (1979).
24 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (1977).
25 Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
26 Id. at 977–78.
27 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989).
16
17
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of Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Watson addresses the
concern that vetting the impact of myriad subjective practices
will be so daunting for employers, they will have no recourse but to
default to quotas, to ensure subjective decisions result in proportional outcomes.28 Quotas, of course, are prohibited by Title VII.29
Justice O’Connor sought to allay fears that employment decisions
would improperly focus on bottom-line statistics by highlighting
the substantial hurdles a disparate impact plaintiff must overcome
to prevail on a subjective theory—in other words, she opined that
proof of an overall statistical disparity should not suffice30:
The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is challenged. Although this has been relatively easy to do in challenges to standardized tests, it may
sometimes be more difficult when subjective selection criteria
are at issue. Especially in cases where an employer combines
subjective criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules
or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating
and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.31

Justice O’Connor found in Connecticut v. Teal32 support
for her view that a disparate impact must be directly tied to the
disparity caused by a discrete aspect of the selection process.33
In Teal, the employer could not defend the disparate pass-rate
on a written promotion test by pointing to the “bottom line” proportional racial representation of the employees at issue.34 Justice O’Connor applied that same principle in reverse—neither can
a plaintiff rely on bottom-line differences as evidence to support
a claim that a subjective decision or process caused a disparate
Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
30 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993–94.
31 Id. at 994.
32 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 460 (Powell, J., dissenting).
34 See id. at 452 (“In sum, respondents’ claim of disparate impact from the
examination, a pass-fail barrier to employment opportunity, states a prima
facie case of employment discrimination under § 703(a)(2), despite their employer’s nondiscriminatory ‘bottom line,’ and that ‘bottom line’ is no defense
to this prima facie case under § 703(h).”).
28
29
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impact.35 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the disparity was
caused by an identifiable step in the selection process.36
As described by Justice O’Connor in Watson:
Once the employment practice at issue has been identified,
causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that
the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants
for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.37

Having identified the challenged practice, the plaintiff must adduce
statistical evidence regarding the impact of that particular practice, rather than merely pointing to an overall disproportionality
resulting from the entire decision-making process.38 Accordingly,
RIF statistics conflating the impact of a multifaceted employee
selection process generally should be deemed insufficient, because
aggregate statistical analysis does not isolate and identify the
specific employment practice that caused the disparate impact.39
An important exception to this general rule was created
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which Congress passed in direct
response to Wards Cove Packing Co.40 The Act codified a disparate
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982).
See generally Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 140
(3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]o establish a prima facie case of disparate impact in a Title
VII case, a plaintiff must (1) identify a specific employment policy or practice
of the employer and (2) proffer evidence, typically statistical evidence, (3) of a
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions (4) because of their membership
in a protected group .... With respect to meeting her burden with respect to
(3), a plaintiff will typically have to demonstrate that the disparity in impact
is sufficiently large that it is highly unlikely to have occurred at random, and
to do so by using one of several tests of statistical significance. There is no
precise threshold that must be met in every case, but a finding of statistical
significance with a probability level at or below 0.05, or at 2 to 3 standard
deviations or greater, will typically be sufficient.” (citations omitted)).
37 Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; see also N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (“A prima facie violation of the Act may be established
by statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of
denying members of one race equal access to employment opportunities.”).
38 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
39 See Teal, 457 U.S. at 458.
40 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). In discussing the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court remarked that “[o]ne of the purposes of
35
36
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impact cause of action and included, as an affirmative defense,
that a plaintiff is excused from identifying a particular criterion
causing the disparate impact by proving the selection criteria are
incapable of “separation for analysis.”41 In that event, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed in terms of the bottom line.42
Importantly, this exception does not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which remains subject to the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Watson and Wards Cove.43
II.“PATTERN OR PRACTICE” AS A METHOD OF PROVING
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
The Supreme Court, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,44 approved pattern or practice evidence as
a means of proving systemic intentional discrimination, or stated
differently, disparate treatment.45 In a pattern or practice case, a
plaintiff’s burden is to establish that the discrimination complained
of is the employer’s “standard operating procedure”—its usual,
rather than an exceptional, way of doing business.46 Typically, this
that amendment was to modify the Court’s holding in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio ... a case in which we narrowly construed the employer’s exposure
to liability on a disparate-impact theory.” Id. See also Niall A. Paul, Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: The Supreme Court’s Disparate Treatment of the
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 127, 158 (1990).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
42 Id.
43 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (“While the relevant 1991 amendments [to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964] expanded the coverage of Title VII, they did not
amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination. Hence, Wards
Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.”).
44 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
45 Id. at 361. In the case of private plaintiffs, this method of proof has been
limited to class actions. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772
(1976) (“But petitioners here have carried their burden of demonstrating the
existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice by the respondents
and, therefore, the burden will be upon respondents to prove that individuals
who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination.”). Pattern or practice disparate treatment claims may be brought by a plaintiff class
that is properly certified, or, by the Attorney General or EEOC. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a), (c); see also 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2:20
(6th ed. 1994) (describing pattern or practice discrimination under Title VII).
46 See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
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proof consists of evidence of significant statistical disparities,
coupled with anecdotal evidence that brings the statistics “convincingly to life.”47 Statistical evidence, without more, will not prove
a prima facie case.48
Prima facie proof creates a presumption that the employer’s adverse actions affecting members of the class are discriminatory.49 To avoid liability to each class member, the employer must
prove the same adverse action regarding that employee would
have been taken notwithstanding the pattern or practice.50
Although both pattern or practice cases and disparate impact cases are heavily dependent on statistics,51 the focus of the
statistics differs, at least in principle.52 Disparate impact statistics
generally must target a particular facially neutral practice and
demonstrate it results in the disproportionate selection of protected group members.53 That proof often is made with statistics
47 Id. at 338–39 (“The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with
the testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific instances of discrimination .... But, as even our brief summary of the evidence shows, this
was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’ The individuals who testified about their personal experiences with the company
brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.”).
48 Id. at 339–40 n.20 (“Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are
probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination ....”); see also AFSCME v. County of
Nassau, 96 F.3d 644, 647, 651 (2d Cir. 1996).
49 Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 359 n.45.
50 Id. at 360–62 (“At the initial, ‘liability’ stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the
Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Its
burden is to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden
then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or
practice by demonstrating that the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or
insignificant. An employer might show, for example, that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination, or that during the period it is alleged to have pursued a discriminatory
policy it made too few employment decisions to justify the inference that it had
engaged in a regular practice of discrimination.”).
51 See id. at 339–40 n.20; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487
U.S. 977, 987, 992, 994–95 (1988).
52 See infra text accompanying notes 53–58.
53 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328–31 (1977); Watson, 487 U.S. at
994 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478,
492–93 n.21 (3d Cir. 1999); Guster v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., No.
1:02-CV-145, 2004 WL 1854181, at *27–29 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2004).

442 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:433
comparing the selection rate of a protected group to that of the
favored group under the neutral selection criterion.54 As explained, whether selections are proportional at the “bottom line”
generally is irrelevant.55
In contrast, statistics supporting an alleged pattern or
practice focus primarily on the bottom line, provided they account
for legitimate, non-discriminatory selection criteria.56 As a result,
simple comparisons between the demographics of those adversely
affected relative to the pool of those at risk of adverse selection
may be too general to be probative.57 On the other hand, analyses
that account for the jobs employees perform, how well they perform, and their experience, along with other non-discriminatory
explanations for selection, may indicate discrimination if a significant disparity remains notwithstanding these neutral considerations.58 However, distinctions between statistics probative
of disparate impact and pattern or practice tend to vanish if the
RIF as a whole constitutes the facially neutral practice.59 This is
See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329–30.
See Chamallas, supra note 15, at 311.
56 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308, 309–13 (1977);
Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 340–41, 355–56.
57 See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13 (“In Teamsters, the comparison between the percentage of Negroes on the employer’s work force and the percentage in the general areawide population was highly probative, because the
job skill there involved—the ability to drive a truck—is one that many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire. When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather
than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value. The comparative statistics introduced
by the Government in the District Court, however, were properly limited to
public school teachers, and therefore this is not a case like Mayor v. Educational Equality League ... in which the racial-composition comparisons failed
to take into account special qualifications for the position in question.”) (internal citations omitted).
58 See generally Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d
Cir. 2017) (analyzing whether ADEA claim must include entire age-protected
group—all employees over the age of forty—or, whether the plaintiffs could
argue RIF disproportionately impacted employees over fifty); Council 31,
AFCME v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing differences between disparate impact and pattern and practice claims within the context of
allegedly discriminatory layoff decisions).
59 See Donaldson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 794 F. Supp. 498, 504–06, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F. App’x 603, 606 (9th Cir. 2005);
Ferrette v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 105 F. App’x 722, 725–27 (6th Cir.
54
55
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most common when RIF decisions are largely or exclusively subjective.60 The remainder of this Article addresses this intersection
between pattern or practice and disparate impact claims when
decisions are subjective, using RIF decisions as an example.
III.SUBJECTIVE DECISIONS ARE NOT PER SE INSEPARABLE
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, an African American employee, applied but was rejected for four promotions to
supervisory positions, and each time the employer selected a white
applicant for the position.61 The Bank, which employed about eighty
employees, “had not developed precise and formal criteria for
evaluating candidates for the positions for which [the plaintiff]
unsuccessfully applied.”62 Stated differently, the employer “relied
instead on the subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be
filled.”63 Further, the supervisors who made the decisions regarding
the four promotions were white.64
Although unremarked by Justice O’Connor, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Watson reveals that the plaintiff’s case is emblematic of an important category of cases that arise when the selection
process consists of both objective and subjective features.65 The
Fifth Circuit, in reviewing the district court’s opinion, observed that
“[t]he district court specifically credited the Bank’s assertion that it
promoted [the white employees] rather than Watson because in
all three instances Watson had less experience or supervisory experience than the individual chosen for promotion.”66 Further, the
Fifth Circuit highlighted that, although the district court “noted”
that the white employees selected for promotion over Watson
2004); Sullivan v. Smith Filter Corp., No. 04-4045, 2005 WL 8164768, at *6, *7
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2005).
60 See, e.g., Durante, 144 F. App’x at 605–07.
61 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr. 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
62 Id. at 982.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 798 F.2d 791, 798–99 (5th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
66 Id. The Fifth Circuit found the evidence regarding the fourth promotion
was equipoised, and therefore deferred to the judgment of the district court.
Id. at 799.
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received slightly higher or comparable performance evaluations,
the lower court primarily emphasized the white employees’ superior supervisory experience in concluding the employer had not
engaged in unlawful discrimination.67 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
accepted the district court’s characterization of the selection criteria as consisting of objective features—employment and supervisory experience (objective dimensions), as well as performance
evaluations (a subjective component).68 On appeal, the Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that a subjective element in the decision
process does not preclude a disparate impact challenge focusing
on that subjective component.69
If a subjective assessment is expressed as a number, for
example, a performance rating, it is as amenable to statistical
analysis as an objective component.70 In that event, there is no reason to assess a RIF solely at “the bottom line”—that is, reviewing
only the ultimate RIF selections as a whole—because an employee’s
scores on the objective and subjective elements of the process are
reported separately, and therefore capable of being separated for
analysis.71 Further, whether subjectively rated “performance”
adversely impacts a protected group can be determined directly.72
Id. at 798–99.
Id.
69 Watson, 487 U.S. at 989 (“We are persuaded that our decisions in Griggs
and succeeding cases could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were
applied only to standardized selection practices. However one might distinguish
“subjective” from “objective” criteria, it is apparent that selection systems that
combine both types would generally have to be considered subjective in nature.”).
70 See Elisabeth Svensson, Guidelines to Statistical Evaluation of Data
from Rating Scales and Questionnaires, 33 J. REHAB. MED. 47 (2001); see also
S. S. Stevens, On the Theory of Scales of Measurement, 103 SCI. 677, 678–79
(1946). The only problem it presents is that the scoring of “performance”
should be considered an ordinal, rather than a cardinal, scale. See Bryan
Caplan, The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations, 65 S. ECON. J. 823,
827 (1999). In other words, although it makes sense to consider an employee
whose experience is ten times greater than a comparator’s, there is no meaningful sense in which an employee whose performance is rated a ten can be
viewed as being ten times the performer as the employee who is rated a one.
See id. However, there are standard statistical techniques for assessing the
adverse impact of an ordinal measure. See J. Scott Granberg-Rademacker, An
Algorithm for Converting Ordinal Scale Measurement Data to Interval/Ratio
Scale, 70 EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 74, 74–76, 78 (2010).
71 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; supra text accompanying note 68.
72 See Svensson, supra note 70, at 47; see also Stevens, supra note 70, at
678, 679.
67
68
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In other words, “subjectivity” does not imply criteria are “unmeasurable,” and if subjective ratings are numerical or categorical, such as good, better, best, they can be analyzed as readily as
objective measures.73
The same is true when an employer bases its layoff decisions on subjective ratings of multiple employee traits.74 For example, an employer may rate each trait on numerical scales of one
to three in terms of potential and performance.75 This describes
an evaluation system commonly referred to as the “9-block” system.76 As explained by one district court:
The chart, as the name suggests, appears graphically as a threeby-three square containing nine blocks. The columns represent
‘sustained performance,’ while the rows represent “employee
potential.” Thus, the higher that a name appears, the more potential the employee is deemed to have, while the further to the
right that a name appears, the better her performance has been.
Each block is identified with a description, ranging from “Consistent Star” in block “1” to ”Lower Performer” in block “9” in
the lower left.77

The adverse impact, if any, of each of these scales may be
evaluated independently of the other, to determine if either criterion—rated employee performance or rated employee potential—adversely impacts one or more demographic groups.78 The
subjective nature of these ratings makes this no more difficult to
quantify and analyze than if these scores derived from objective
tests.79
See id. at 47; see also id. at 678, 679.
See id. at 47.
75 See infra text accompanying note 77; Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 086292, 2014 WL 2920503, at *19 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014). See generally Succession
Planning: What is a 9-box grid?, SHRM (Mar. 9, 2018) [hereinafter 9-Box Plan],
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/whats
a9boxgridandhowcananhrdepartmentuseit.aspx [https://perma.cc/A6H4-3MMV].
76See generally 9-Box Plan, supra note 75.
77 Bell, 2014 WL 2920503, at *19. See generally 9-Box Plan, supra note 75.
78 See Davis v. Harvey, No. 04 CV 1051, 2006 WL 2794318, at *3, *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2006); see also O’Neill v. Americold Logistics, LLC, No. H-13-0333,
2014 WL 3795606, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2014); 9-Box Plan, supra note 75.
79 See supra text accompanying note 73. Svensson, supra note 70, at 47;
see also Stevens, supra note 70, at 678–79.
73
74
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A similar conclusion applies if subjective assessments are
administered sequentially on a “pass-fail” basis.80 For example,
suppose RIF candidates first are assessed in terms of performance,
and those regarded as subpar are designated for layoff.81 The
remaining group is next assessed in terms of potential.82 Those
with the most positive assessments on this trait are retained, and
the rest are laid off.83 At the conclusion of the RIF, it is straightforward to determine whether the attrition for any demographic
group is attributable to either performance or potential.84 Although
purely subjective, their separate impacts can be measured and
determined.85 In general, the sequential nature of RIF decisions
implemented in the manner described here would allow those who
survive any stage to be compared to those who entered that same
phase, and would permit the analysis of the associated attrition
as a gauge of any adverse impact. Subjective practices likewise are
separable if one set of practices succeeds the other.86 For example,
one method of decision making may have been in effect in year
one, and then replaced by different subjective criteria in year
two.87 It is a simple matter to identify and segregate the decisions subject to each regime.
See supra text accompanying notes 68, 70–73; Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Tr., 798 F.2d 791, 798–99 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 487 U.S. 977
(1988); Svensson, supra note 70, at 47; Stevens, supra note 70, at 678–79; see
also U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT., PASS/FAIL ASSESSMENT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (Jan.
2000), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/performance-management
/reference-materials/historical/pass_fail_assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8B65-Q3UC]. See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Comment, Differential Pass-Fail
Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 793 (1978).
81 See Zuniga v. Boeing Co., 133 F. App’x 570, 572–73 (10th Cir. 2005);
Donald P. Lawless, Rigorous RIF Process Defeats Discrimination Claims, NAT’L
L. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/rigorous-rif-process
-defeats-discrimination-claims [https://perma.cc/SG6U-M9KJ].
82 Zuniga, 133 F. App’x at 572–73.
83 Beaird v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 1998).
84 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; Lawless, supra note 81; supra note 70;
supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
85 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; supra note 70; supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
86 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; supra note 70; supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
87 See, e.g., Smith v. Township of East Greenwich, 344 F. App'x 740, 742, 743
(3d Cir. 2009); Zuniga v. Boeing Co., 133 F. App’x 570, 572–73 (10th Cir. 2005).
80
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Thus, the inability to separate the disparate impact of
each subjective practice arises principally when the only indication of how an employee fared in a subjective evaluation is the
employment decision itself.88 In the case of a RIF, this is the decision whether to retain or lay off a particular employee.89 To illustrate, suppose layoff decisions are made by a committee that
jointly assesses employees in terms of loosely described, subjective criteria. At the end of the day, they compile a list of those
designated for layoff, with no record of the stages at which they
arrived at these decisions. The only objective facts are the demographics of the workforce before and after these decisions. These
groups easily are compared, but the harder question is whether
any differences in selection rates can be challenged under a disparate impact theory, rather than solely in terms of disparate
treatment or pattern or practice of discrimination, which require
proof of intent.90 The remainder of this Article considers whether,
in this situation, claims of disparate impact and disparate treatment are compatible.
IV.WHY DISTINGUISH THESE THEORIES?
Disparate impact claims, as compared to disparate treatment or pattern or practice claims, provide different remedies
and impose different burdens of proof.91 A disparate treatment
plaintiff who prevails under Title VII may be awarded compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to backpay, front pay,
and attorney’s fees.92 A prevailing disparate impact plaintiff is
See Carla J. Rozycki & Emma J. Sullivan, Employees Bringing DisparateImpact Claims Under the ADEA Continue to Face an Uphill Battle Despite the
Supreme Court's Decisions in Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 8, 9–10 (2010).
89 See, e.g., Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F. App'x 603, 604–07 (9th Cir.
2005).
90 See infra Parts IV–V; see also Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 626–28 (2011).
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977,
994 (1988) (plurality opinion); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252–56 (1981); see also Davidson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Util., 470 F.
Supp. 2d 934, 944 (S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Emp. Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d
1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
92 § 1981a(a).
88
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limited to equitable relief.93 Additionally, a disparate treatment
claim may be tried to a jury, and most courts hold that a disparate
impact claim must be tried to the court.94 In effect, a disparate
impact plaintiff bears the heavier burden of proof in establishing
a prima facie case,95 because she first must isolate the practice
allegedly causing a disparate impact, and then present statistical
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706
or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... against a respondent who
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act ...,
and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under
section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection
(b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
Id.
93 Davidson, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (“Prevailing on the issue of liability,
however, does not automatically entitle each Plaintiff to an award of compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are not, as a matter of law, available as
a remedy in a disparate impact case .... To the extent they are entitled to equitable
relief it could come in the form of an award of back pay.” (internal citations
omitted)); In re Emp. Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d at 1315 (“If the court
ultimately finds that the employer has violated the disparate impact provisions of Title VII, and is therefore engaged in an unlawful employment practice,
the court may order a wide range of equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(1) (1994).”).
94 See, e.g., Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 143 F.3d 227, 230 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII claims could not be
tried to a jury, and compensatory and punitive damages could not be awarded.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination (i.e., not in cases involving
disparate impact only), and jury trials were permitted only in cases where
compensatory and punitive damages were proper, in other words, in disparate treatment cases .... Therefore, a jury may not determine the disparate
impact claim, and, if that is the only claim left, there is no need for a jury.”).
95 Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 937 (1983) (“The plaintiff’s initial burden with respect to a disparate
impact claim is heavier than it is when disparate treatment is alleged.”); see
Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1523 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Under the
disparate impact theory, a facially neutral employment practice can be in violation of Title VII even if there is no evidence of an employer’s subjective intent to discriminate. But, for disparate impact purposes, depending on the
type of data used to compile the statistics, an allegation that there exists a
statistical discrepancy in the racial composition of the workforce may not be
sufficient.” (internal citations omitted)).
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evidence regarding causation.96 However, once a plaintiff makes
that proof, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer who
must either produce evidence that the subjective practice either
is job-related and consistent with business necessity, under Title
VII, or else that it is a reasonable factor other than age, if the
suit is under the ADEA.97
Most pertinent to this discussion is how the theory of disparate impact fares when an employee is permitted to challenge an
entire decision-making process as an integrated whole.98 This is the
example in which employees are selected for a reduction in force
based solely on subjective assessments that manifest in the ultimate RIF decision.99 Stripped of the need to identify any element
of the subjective process as the cause of the offending pattern of
selections, the plaintiff may prove a prima facie case by establishing
just one element—disproportionality, i.e., the protected group of
which the plaintiff is a member was selected for the RIF in disproportionate numbers.100 Essentially, when “subjectivity” is the
sole offending practice, disparate impact operates as a strict liability rule.101
See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
97 Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 110–11 (1st Cir. 2016) (“In a
nutshell, litigation of [a disparate impact claim] focuses on three questions:
Do the plaintiffs show by competent evidence that the employer is utilizing
an employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race; If
so, does the employer show that the challenged employment practice creating
this disparate result is nevertheless job-related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity; If so, do the plaintiffs show that the
employer has refused to adopt an alternative practice that equally or better
serves the employer’s legitimate business needs, yet has a lesser disparate
impact? To prevail, plaintiffs require a ‘yes’ answer to the first question, and
either a ‘no’ to the second question or a ‘yes’ to the third question.” (internal
citations omitted)); see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (discussing ADEA’s exception permitting “reasonable factors other than age.”).
98 See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 368 (2d Cir. 1999).
99 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (plurality opinion).
100 See id. at 994.
101 In tort law, strict liability is commonly referred to as “liability without
fault.” 31A AM. JUR. 2D Explosions & Explosives § 163 (2020); Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 712, (1995) (“Strict liability
means liability without regard to fault ....”) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
96
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The courts, and subsequently Congress, have constructed an
order of proof that safeguards disparate impact claims from conflicting with Title VII’s prohibition against intentional discrimination—42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j).102 That provision prevents employers
from granting a preference to any protected group because of an
imbalance in the employment of protected group members relative
to their representation in the available workforce.103 This is the
basis for prohibiting the use of quotas.104 Yet, if challengers to
subjective employment practices are stripped of the need to identify
a specific offending practice, and permitted to challenge the RIF as
a whole, then as Justice O’Connor recognized in Watson, employers
who wish to avoid potential liability will be led inevitably, overtly
or covertly, to adopt quotas or else abandon subjective judgments.105
But, as she observed, there are many instances in which subjective judgments may be unavoidable.106
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009) (“[W]e adopt the strongbasis-in-evidence standard as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any
conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of
Title VII.”); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 251, 258 (2005) (“Had
Congress intended to inaugurate disparate impact liability in the ADEA, one
would expect to find some indication of that intent in the text and the legislative history. There is none.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
103 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(j).
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment
by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to
membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage
of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
Id.
104 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
105 Id. at 993.
106 Id. at 999 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578
(1978)).
102
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[I]t has long been recognized that legal rules leaving any class
of employers with "little choice" but to adopt such measures
would be "far from the intent of Title VII.” ... Allowing the
evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead to this result
would be contrary to Congress’ clearly expressed intent ....107

In Watson, Justice O’Connor elaborated on the safeguards
in Title VII intended to thwart that result.108 First is the requirement that the plaintiff must specify the particular element
of the subjective selection process that allegedly caused the disparate impact.109 Requiring the plaintiff to identify a particular
element of the selection process undermines quotas attuned to
the “bottom line,” because liability may exist irrespective of bottomline parity:110
However, even if on remand respondents can show that nonwhites are underrepresented in the at-issue jobs in a manner that
is acceptable under the standards set forth in Part II, supra,
this alone will not suffice to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. Respondents will also have to demonstrate that
the disparity they complain of is the result of one or more of the
employment practices that they are attacking here, specifically
showing that each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites and
nonwhites. To hold otherwise would result in employers being
Id. at 993 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449
(1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). This same sentiment was echoed the following term by Justice White:
The Court of Appeals’ theory, at the very least, would mean that
any employer who had a segment of his work force that was—for
some reason—racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and
forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of
defending the “business necessity” of the methods used to select the other members of his work force. The only practicable
option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas,
insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial
composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result
that Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII ....
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j)).
108 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993–94 (“[W]e think it imperative to explain in
some detail why the evidentiary standards that apply in these cases should
serve as adequate safeguards against the danger that Congress recognized.”).
109 Id. at 994.
110 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982).
107
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potentially liable for “the myriad of innocent causes that may
lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
forces.”111

Conflating subjective practices with the ultimate employment
decision eviscerates this safeguard.112
The requirement to identify the singular offending practice
is even more compelling under the ADEA.113 The Supreme Court
noted “the scope of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is
narrower than under Title VII.”114 Thus:
A plaintiff’s initial burden is heavier under a disparate impact
theory than it is under a disparate treatment theory .... To plead a
disparate impact claim under the ADEA, it is not enough to
simply allege that there is a disparate impact on workers, or
point to a generalized policy that leads to such an impact. Rather, the employee is responsible for isolating and identifying
the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible
for any observed statistical disparities. Moreover, the plaintiff
must show that the facially neutral employment practice had
a significantly discriminatory impact. Statistical evidence of
this impact must be limited in scope in accordance with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1) and tied to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint.115

If the plaintiff proves disproportionality, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer, who must demonstrate that the challenged
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (emphasis in original) (quoting Watson,
487 U.S. at 992).
112 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
113 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005); see Debra Burke,
ADEA Disparate Impact Discrimination: A Pyrrhic Victory?, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 47, 57 (2008) (“[U]nlike Title VII, the ADEA language significantly narrows its coverage by permitting any ‘otherwise prohibited’ action ‘where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.’”) (quoting Smith,
544 U.S. at 233).
114 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
115 Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018
WL 1942525, at *22 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) (quotations and citations omitted);
see also Powell v. Dall. Morning News L.P., 776 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265 (N.D.
Tex. 2011) (citation omitted) (“Once Plaintiffs have carried their heavy burden of isolating a specific policy and demonstrating the statistical disparate
impact resulting from the policy, the burden shifts to the Defendants to prove
the actions were based on reasonable factors other than age.”), aff’d, 486 F.
App’x 469 (5th Cir. 2012).
111
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practice, i.e., subjectivity, is job-related and consistent with business
necessity, under Title VII, or a reasonable factor other than age,
under ADEA.116 Although few cases discuss how to meet this burden, Justice O’Connor’s observation in Watson is pertinent:
It is self-evident that many jobs, for example those involving
managerial responsibilities, require personal qualities that
have never been considered amenable to standardized testing.
In evaluating claims that discretionary employment practices
are insufficiently related to legitimate business purposes, it must
be borne in mind that “[c]ourts are generally less competent
than employers to restructure business practices, and unless
mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.”117

In contrast, disparate treatment plaintiffs cannot prevail
merely by demonstrating disproportionality; they must prove
intent.118 Although statistics can take a plaintiff a long way, virtually all courts require additional evidence of intent.119 Absent
additional evidence, no burden of proof shifts to the employer, as
it does in a disparate impact claim.120 Under these circumstances,
a disparate impact plaintiff gains the benefit of a lighter burden
of proof, and imposes a heavier burden on the defendant, who
See Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 110–11 (1st Cir. 2016)
(discussing business necessity under Title VII); Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing how plaintiff establishes disproportionality); see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 240–41 (discussing reasonable factors other than age in the ADEA context). See generally Mack A.
Player, Essay, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That Is Not
the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819 (1997).
117 Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)); see also McReynolds v.
Sodexho Marriott Servs. Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting
Mozee v. Am. Com. Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1991)) (“In
order to sustain a subjective practice through a business necessity defense,
therefore, an employer would have to argue that the subjectivity of the step is
job-related—in other words, that something about the position requires the
selector to make a subjective evaluation of the applicant’s abilities.”).
118 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973)
(remanded to determine if employer’s given reason for rejection was pretextual).
119 See, e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., id.; Powell, 776 F. Supp. at 265 (citing Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008)).
116
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must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the challenged
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.121
Accordingly, courts that are reluctant to insist that plaintiffs distinguish among various subjective practices, risk creating a cause of action in conflict with the statute plaintiffs seek to
enforce.122
V.HOW COURTS HAVE AVOIDED CONFLICTS BETWEEN DISPARATE
TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT ALLEGATIONS
Although courts recognize that a selection process may be
analyzed as a single employment practice only if “the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis,”123 some courts strain to avoid this result.124
Others avoid conflating selection criteria by distinguishing between the policy of neutrally delegating decisions, and how managers exercise that delegated authority, which may or may not
reflect discriminatory animus.125
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 533 (2015) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578
(2009) (“[B]efore rejecting a business justification—or, in the case of a governmental entity, an analogous public interest—a court must determine that
a plaintiff has shown that there is ‘an available alternative ... practice that
has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.’”).
123 Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i)).
124 See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405
(9th Cir. 1985).
125 See generally Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008);
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th
Cir. 2012); Fox v. Bonneville Power Admin., 243 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In
their complaint, Plaintiffs mentioned the ‘Collaboration’ process that gave
management-level employees responsibility for reviewing and selecting candidates for promotion. Plaintiffs’ complaint discussed the emphasis placed on
hiring women and minority workers. In other words, Plaintiffs contended that
the policy of giving the employees in charge of the Collaboration process the
discretion to make promotional decisions, combined with management’s emphasis on leveling the playing field for women and minorities, had a disparate impact on workers over 50 years old. Plaintiffs’ contentions are sufficient
to state a disparate impact claim.”); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417
121
122
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If “delegation” is the neutral practice—that is, the employer’s
delegation of decisions to individual managers—this greatly expands the group of employees potentially impacted by the employment practice, because all subsequent decisions ultimately
spring from the employer’s delegation of authority.126 For example, the Ninth Circuit found that “[an employer’s] policy of committing employment decisions to the subjective discretion of its
managers is a specific employment practice subject to a disparate impact analysis.”127 As described by that court, the offending
policy is permitting managers to exercise discretion, rather than
the manner in which the discretion is exercised.128 Thus, managers may be overt in their discriminatory animus, but the employer’s ostensibly neutral act of placing decisions in their hands
permits their intentional acts to be analyzed through the lens of
facial neutrality.129
A similar delegation is described in a Seventh Circuit de130
cision. Judge Posner considers a hypothetical police department
in which the department permits senior police officers to select
junior officers with whom to partner.131 Suppose the senior officers choose junior officers matching their same demographic:
There would be no intentional discrimination at the departmental level, but the practice of allowing police officers to choose
their partners could be challenged as enabling sexual and racial
(9th Cir. 1990); Rudwall v. Blackrock, Inc., No. CO9-5176TEH, 2011 WL
767965, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011); Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F.
App’x 603, 606–07 (9th Cir. 2005) (“When an employer combines subjective
and objective criteria, the plaintiff is required to isolate and identify the specific offending employment practice.”).
126 But see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 377 (2011).
127 Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25.
128 See also Fox, 243 F.3d 547 (Table) at *1.
129 See Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25 (“Wells Fargo admits that the authority
to determine which jobs would be eliminated and as to who would fill the remaining positions was delegated to the department heads. While the managers
were instructed to consider an employee’s performance and longevity, Wells
Fargo admits that the process of job elimination and restaffing was otherwise
discretionary and subjective. Accordingly, as in Watson, Wells Fargo’s policy
of committing employment decisions to the subjective discretion of its managers is a specific employment practice subject to a disparate impact analysis.”).
130 McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489.
131 Id.
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discrimination—as having in the jargon of discrimination law
a “disparate impact” on a protected group—and if a discriminatory effect was proved, then to avoid an adverse judgment
the department would have to prove that the policy was essential
to the department’s mission.132

Of course, in both cases the employer would be liable for
intentional discrimination by their managers because these managers are exercising authority delegated by the employer.133 But
according to two Courts of Appeals, the same employment decisions
create both disparate impact and disparate treatment liability.134
The problem with “delegation” as the facially neutral practice
is that the exception swallows the rule.135 In virtually all instances,
an employer’s decision to delegate authority is subjective—someone
ultimately must decide who stays and who goes, and on what
basis.136 Typically, the delegation is with benign intent.137 “[L]eft
to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely
most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”138 Yet,
should the delegatees act in a discriminatory manner, courts following the Seventh and Ninth Circuits would recognize a disparate
impact claim, although ultimate decision-makers may have intentionally discriminated in their decision-making process.139
Id. This hypothetical obscures the fact that there were two policies attacked in this case. One was objective—considering a broker’s existing volume of
business in assigning new accounts; the other was subjective—permitting
brokers to form “teams” that work together based on the predilections of team
members. The hypothetical relates solely to the latter. See id. at 488–89.
133 See id. at 489 (Seventh Circuit view); Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25 (Ninth
Circuit view).
134 See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489; Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25.
135 See Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat's
Paw: Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 407–09 (2008) (highlighting
the lenient approaches in the Fourth and Tenth circuits); see, e.g., Rose, 902
F.2d at 1424–25.
136 See Befort & Olig, supra note 135, at 407–09; see, e.g., Rose, 902 F.2d at
1424–25.
137 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
138 Id.
139 See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489; Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25.
132

2021]

BLURRED LINES

457

A similar conundrum results when courts are too quick to
find that an employer’s decision-making process is inseparable
for analysis.
Where the system of promotion is pervaded by a lack of uniform criteria, criteria that are subjective as well as variable,
discretionary placements and promotions, the failure to follow
set procedures and the absence of written policies or justifications for promotional decisions, the court is not required to
“pinpoint particular aspects of [the system]” that are unfavorable to [the protected group].140

When a court determines an employer’s delegation decisions are inseparable, and therefore may be analyzed as one
employment practice for purposes of a disparate impact claim,
courts admit bottom-line analyses of the ultimate decisions.141
The Second Circuit has considered most thoroughly the
issues arising when subjective decisions conflate with the ultimate
RIF decision.142 The leading case is Maresco v. Evans Chemetics,
Div. of W.R. Grace & Co.143 Maresco involved a RIF accompanying the consolidation of two offices.144 The plaintiff sought to recover under both a disparate impact and disparate treatment
theory of discrimination.145 The court observed:
Both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
can be invoked in a given case to establish ADEA liability,
since they are simply alternative doctrinal premises for a
statutory violation .... We do not believe, however, that the
disparate impact theory provides any significant analytical
contribution in this case.
The facially neutral employment practice that Maresco invokes as
the premise for disparate impact liability coalesces with the
discharge which he claims to have constituted disparate treatment. Because “[e]vidence of the employer’s subjective intent
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1992 WL 295957, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1992) (citations omitted).
141 Id.
142 See Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, Div. of W.R. Grace & Co., 964 F.2d
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1992).
143 See generally id.
144 Id. at 107–08.
145 Id.
140
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to discriminate” must be provided to support a claim of disparate treatment, ... allowing the disparate impact doctrine to
be invoked as Maresco proposes would simply provide a means to
circumvent the subjective intent requirement in any disparate treatment case.146

As the Second Circuit recognizes, a disparate treatment
plaintiff must present proof of intent, which usually requires additional evidence beyond demonstrating a statistical difference.147
In contrast, a disparate impact plaintiff, once freed of identifying
any neutral practice, can present prima facie proof based solely
on a statistical difference.148 Thus, Second Circuit courts are
alert to pleadings that conflate intentional and neutral theories,
viewing these pleadings as “nonsensically” alleging policies that
are both neutral, yet intentionally discriminatory.149 Accordingly,
these courts follow the “Maresco rule” and dismiss the disparate
impact claim.150
Barrett v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.151 illustrates that reasoning:
These latter two allegations [claims relating to the alleged
disparate impact of manager performance assessments], though
Id. at 115 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (“[T]he eight discharges that occurred in connection with the divisional consolidation at issue in this case are unlikely to provide an adequate
basis for the sort of statistical analysis frequently employed in disparate impact cases.”).
148 See Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 140 (3d Cir.
2010); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988); see
also text accompanying supra note 21.
149 Hunt v. Tektronix, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 998, 1009 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); see also
Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (finding “nonsensical”
plaintiff’s contention that her employer’s alleged policy of intentionally discriminating against women caused a disparate impact on women), aff’d, 79 F.3d
1140 (3d Cir. 1996); Zawacki v. Realogy Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (D.
Conn. 2009) (“Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant’s procedures in conducting
the RIFs were nothing more than a cover for behind-the-scenes, intentional
discrimination against its older employees. There is no allegation of a facially
neutral practice or policy that fell more harshly on the protected group.”) (citing
Maresco, 964 F.2d at 115).
150 Hunt, 952 F. Supp. at 1009; see also Verney, 872 F. Supp. at 193;
Zawacki, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 281; supra text accompanying note 149.
151 39 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
146
147
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styled as disparate impact claims, are really claims of disparate treatment. The gravamen of the SAC on this point is that
managers discriminated against women by giving them unjustifiably low performance evaluations and placing them on
probation without reason for doing so, which resulted in reduced compensation. Although, according to the SAC, Defendants’
policy of giving weight to these discriminatory assessments
caused the discrimination, the real source of the disparity is
the managers’ allegedly discriminatory reviews and probation
decisions. Accepting the SAC’s factual allegations as true, this
is not a situation where Defendants followed a facially-neutral
practice that created a disparity; this is a situation in which
managers intentionally treated male and female employees
differently. That is a disparate treatment claim.152

The court then invoked the Maresco rule, finding the claims
coalesced, and analyzed the performance evaluation process and
assessments as a disparate treatment claim.153
Similarly, in Hunt v. Tektronix, Inc.,154 the plaintiff alleged
the employer “maintained a discriminatory policy and/or practice
of terminating older individuals within the protected class in the
sales force, to achieve an overall younger sales force[,]” and this
“discriminatory policy and/or practice of terminating older employees had a disparate impact” on each of the plaintiffs.155 The
court dismissed the disparate impact claim, citing a Pennsylvania
court’s description of a neutral, intentionally discriminatory policy as “nonsensical.”156
Id. at 438.
Id.
154 952 F. Supp. 998 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
155 Id. at 1009.
156 Id. (citing Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1995)
(finding “nonsensical” plaintiff’s contention that her employer’s alleged policy
of intentionally discriminating against women caused a disparate impact on
women), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1996)) (“In their responsive memorandum,
plaintiffs contend that the specific employment practice ‘at issue’ is Tektronix’s
layoff policy. However, plaintiffs do not allege that the policy itself, applied as
written, causes a disparate impact. They allege that it is Tektronix’ failure to
follow the policy that causes a disparate impact. This too is nonsensical. To
the extent the plaintiffs assert that Tektronix has diverged from the policy
and used unauthorized criteria in layoff determinations, then their claim
merges with their disparate treatment theory that Tektronix intended to discharge the older employees in favor of the new ones. Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim is dismissed.”).
152
153
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Second Circuit courts also give short shrift to allegations
that a disparate impact is caused by managers who selectively
depart from a company’s stated policy.157 Indeed, in a New York
district court case, a plaintiff alleged his employer’s performance
criteria to select which branch managers would remain employed
had a disparate impact on older workers.158 Importantly, however,
the plaintiff simultaneously argued that the employer “in fact,
chose different and subjective criterion [sic] than required by the
guidelines to make its decisions on who would remain as branch
managers.”159 The court found this was solely a disparate treatment, not a disparate impact, claim.160 “It is clear, then, that plaintiff is not alleging that application of a facially-neutral policy had
a disparate impact, but that [the employer] deliberately singled out
older employees for termination or transfer. That does not state
a disparate-impact claim.”161
Critically, the Maresco rule potentially sweeps more broadly
than the oxymoron of “neutrally intentional” conduct.162 Its logic
suggests that when the effect of subjective practices is indistinguishable from the ultimate employment decision, the disparate
impact and treatment theories are fatally inconsistent.163 “[A]s
the court in Maresco noted, a disparate impact claim may not proceed where the premises supporting it coalesce with the premises
See Renaldi v. Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., 954 F. Supp. 614, 620
(W.D.N.Y. 1997).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.; see also Hunt, 952 F. Supp. At 1009; supra note 156. But see Martin
v. Coinmach Corp., No. 15-CV-8137(AJN)(SN), 2016 WL 6996182, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016) (“Drawing all inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, the
company’s policy of making all merit increases dependent entirely on the discretion of a white supervisor, in the absence of any objective criteria to cabin
or direct that individual’s judgment is a ‘specific employment practice,’ as the
term is used in Watson. It is not relevant that Plaintiffs also allege that Mr.
Tolkup did in fact engage in such intentional discrimination, as long as they
can conceivably establish a prima facie case that Coinmach’s merit raise policy
lead to a statistically significant disparate impact even in the absence of intentional discrimination.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
162 Brown v. City of New York, No. 16 CV 1106(NG) (RER), 2017 WL
1102677, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017) (quoting Maresco, 964 F.2d at 115).
163 Id.
157
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supporting a disparate treatment claim, as such a use of disparate
impact doctrine would ‘simply provide a means to circumvent the
subjective intent requirement in any disparate treatment case.’”164
The logic runs as follows: if an employer’s decision to delegate authority to managers is the ostensibly neutral act, then the
managers themselves act either intentionally or neutrally.165 If
managers are intentionally discriminatory, then their discriminatory animus is the proximate cause of the biased decisions,
not the employer’s neutral decision to grant managers individual
decision-making authority.166 In effect, the manager’s bias is a
superseding cause167 of the employer’s discriminatory selections,
for which the employer is liable as respondeat superior.168 As in
tort law, the manager’s wrongdoing breaks the chain of causation
initiated by the facially neutral policy.169 On the other hand, if
managers act neutrally, then the claim is properly pled as having a disparate impact, because both the employer’s delegation and
the manager’s actions are facially neutral.170 Accordingly, liability may be found under one theory or the other, but not both.171
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
166 Id.
167 See Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605, 618 (5th Cir.
2018) (describing the tort doctrine of intervening or superseding cause).
168 Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2015).
It is hornbook law that ‘[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the acts of his employees committed within the scope of their employment.’ ... A
claim for vicarious liability under a respondeat superior theory
consists, therefore, of two prongs: an employer-employee relationship and a tortious act committed by the employee within
the scope of his employment.
Id. (citations omitted).
169 But see Horowitz v. AT&T, Inc., No. 17-4827 (BRM)(LHG), 2019 WL
8275258, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2019) (“The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the
process for giving surplussed employees the opportunity to apply for new positions is on its face neutral. The subcomponents of that policy, i.e., giving
managers information regarding years of service and surplus status to use in
exercising their discretion as to hiring can be viewed as infecting that process
with age-related bias.”).
170 Brown, 2017 WL at *3.
171 Id. at *5.
164
165
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Plaintiffs nevertheless are permitted to plead in the alternative if they can skirt the “nonsensical” claim of neutrally/intentionally discriminating.172 Thus, in Barrett, the court ultimately
concluded that a plaintiff plausibly could plead disparate impact
and disparate treatment simultaneously, but could not prevail
simultaneously under each theory:173
Nor is it problematic that the SAC identifies one practice in
support of both a pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim
and a disparate impact claim. Of course, were the case to go to
trial, the manner in which the Company assigns base salaries
cannot support both claims: the alleged disparities in female
employees’ base salaries are either caused by intentional discrimination or by a facially-neutral policy that has a disparate
impact on women. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly permit pleading in the alternative ..., Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged that the manner in which the Company
sets base pay has a disparate impact on women.174

This makes the most sense because the actual impact of a
neutral policy is impossible to gauge if individual discriminators
intervene and influence the results. Imagine a facially neutral
pencil and paper test that is challenged as having a disparate
impact. A much higher fraction of males pass than females. But
suppose the graders are biased against women and therefore erase
female employees’ correct answers and replace them with wrong
answers. A disproportionate number of women fail, but the failure rate is not the fault of the test. Because of the discriminating
graders, it is impossible to know who would have passed were the
test graded fairly.
Under these circumstances, to hold the employer liable under
a disparate impact theory is not just wrong, it may be counterproductive.175 One of the remedies, upon finding a disparate impact, is to enjoin the use of the test, either by substituting a less
discriminatory alternative or eliminating testing entirely.176 However, there is no telling whether the test, if properly graded by
Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 407, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id.
174 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
175 See NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 707 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530
(D.N.J. 2010).
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; see NAACP, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
172
173
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non-biased actors, would have an adverse impact for female employees. To be sure, if the employer is responsible for hiring discriminatory graders, then the employer will be liable under a
theory of intentional discrimination.177 But, under these hypothetical circumstances, it would be “nonsensical” to hold that the
test in question must be replaced.178 This biased-graders example also emphasizes how a disparate impact/disparate treatment
case should be submitted to a jury. Because the discriminatory
motives of the graders or, more realistically, managers, can undermine even the most carefully vetted policy or practice,179 the
jury first should be asked whether those who implemented the
policy acted with discriminatory animus.
CONCLUSION
Although courts strive to distinguish elements of decision
making that allegedly cause a disparate impact, not all decisionmaking processes are readily parsed, as this discussion of RIFs
demonstrates.180 In those instances, the disparate impact theory
of discrimination devolves into a theory of strict liability, which,
subject to affirmative defenses, confers liability based solely on
disproportionate outcomes.181 Yet, Title VII and Supreme Court
cases prohibit finding liability based solely on a disparity in an
employer’s bottom-line statistics.182 Although Title VII provides
an exception when various facets of an employer’s ultimate decision are inseparable, courts have failed to provide clear guidance
regarding how and when this exception applies.183 In analyzing
disparate treatment claims, some courts strain to conclude that
an employer’s decision-making process—more specifically its decision to delegate decision-making to individual managers—is
incapable of separation, and therefore must be analyzed as one
Barrett, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 438.
Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
179 Brown v. City of New York, No. 16 CV 1106(NG) (RER), 2017 WL
1102677, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017).
180 See supra Part II.
181 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
182 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
183 See supra Part V.
177
178
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practice.184 Other courts are more likely to conclude that the
employer’s decision to delegate cannot coexist with allegations of
intentional discrimination by those who exercise delegated authority.185 However, one conclusion seems clear: a plaintiff should
not be able to prevail under both a disparate impact and disparate
treatment theory challenging the same subjective decisions. This
especially is true when selection criteria, although subjective, nevertheless may be more quantified and therefore separately analyzed.

See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002); see also text
accompanying supra note 123.
185 See Am. Fed'n of Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also text accompanying supra note 124.
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